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How can public officials be held accountable, and yet avoid the paradoxes and pathologies of
the current mechanisms of accountability? The answer, claims Harmon (1995), is dialogue. But
what exactly is dialogue, and how is it created? More importantly, how can dialogue ensure
accountability? To address these questions, I begin with a brief description of dialogue and its
basic features, distinguishing it from other forms of communication. An example illustrates how
dialogue occurs in actual practice. Not only does dialogue demonstrate the intelligent manage-
ment of contradictory motives and forces, it also supports Harmon’s claim that it can resolve the
accountability paradox and avoid the atrophy of personal responsibility and political authority.
I suggest that dialogue’s advantage outweighs its cost as a mechanism of accountability under a
particular set of conditions: when public officials confront “wicked problems” that defy definition
and solution, and when traditional problem-solving methods have failed, thus preventing any
one group from imposing its definition of the problem or its solutions on others.
The accountability of public officials in a democratic
society is a topic of long-standing interest (Wilson 1887).
Broadly conceived, accountability implies answerabil-
ity. To be accountable is “to have to answer for one’s
actions or inaction” (Oakerson 1989, 114) and to be re-
sponsible for their consequences (Burke 1986; Cooper
1990; Kearns 1996).
The search for ways to keep public officials account-
able has led scholars to identify various mechanisms of
accountability. For example, Simon, Thompson, and
Smithburg (1991) distinguish between formal and infor-
mal types of accountability. Formal mechanisms are based
on judicial, legislative, and executive or hierarchical con-
trols, whereas informal mechanisms derive from society’s
mores, its political and social philosophies, bureau phi-
losophy and culture, as well as from bureau executives’
and managers’ professional norms and code of ethics
(Simon, Thompson, and Smithburg 1991, 513–61).
Barbara Romzek and Melvin Dubnick (1987) create
finer-grained distinctions among accountability mecha-
nisms that are derived from two dimensions: the source of
control (internal or external) and the degree of control (high
or low) exerted over public agents. Bureaucratic account-
ability (high internal control) derives from hierarchical ar-
rangements that are based on supervision and organiza-
tional directives. Legal accountability (high external con-
trol) is ensured through contractual arrangements. Profes-
sional accountability (low internal control) is based on
deference to the expertise of one’s peers or work group.
Finally, political accountability (low external control) is
established by responsiveness to elected officials, clien-
tele or customers, and other agencies (Romzek and Dubnick
1987; Romzek 1998). Although there is agreement that
accountability in government is necessary, there is little
consensus on which mechanisms should prevail at any point
in time. The result is “a web of multiple, overlapping ac-
countability relationships” within which public officials
must work (Romzek 1998, 197).
Recent directives on bureau strategic planning and bu-
reau results, exemplified in the Government Performance
Results Act of 1993 and the National Performance Review
(Gore 1993), offer an alternative framework for classify-
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ing accountability mechanisms. Bureau executives and
managers are required to plan their bureau’s direction stra-
tegically and state specific goals they wish to pursue (di-
rection-based accountability). They then specify the out-
put and outcome measures that will be used to ascertain
whether bureau results have been achieved (performance-
based accountability). These newest additions build on
earlier efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to
ensure procedure-based accountability—the establishment
of laws, rules, and regulations for the purpose of constrain-
ing and guiding behavior in the implementation of bureau
direction.1
Taken together, these three mechanisms produce what I
call the administrative model of accountability. In prin-
ciple, it offers comprehensive coverage on all aspects of
bureau activity. Direction-based accountability ensures that
organizational goals and objectives are established in ac-
cordance with the aims of political authority and constitu-
ent interests. Performance-based accountability requires
the specification of output and outcomes in order to mea-
sure results and link them to goals that have been set, in
accordance with the norms of management practice. And
procedure-based accountability specifies the laws and rules
of conduct in order to ensure high standards in the execu-
tion of bureau activity—specifically, how a bureau man-
ages its human and material resources equitably and fairly
in the implementation of it goals and objectives.
Despite its endorsement in the public management lit-
erature (Bozeman 1993; Jones and Thompson 1999;
Brudney, O’Toole, and Rainey 2000), the administrative
model of accountability has its critics. Michael Harmon’s
Responsibility as Paradox: A Critique of Rational Dis-
course on Government (1995) offers a particularly tren-
chant critique that centers on the model’s behavioral con-
trols and its legal/technical mode of rationality. He
maintains that current societal trends (such as reinvention),
which demand more and more accountability of public
officials through the issuance of laws, edicts, and rules to
control behavior, will “invariably fail,” as other reform
movements of the past have done. They will be unable to
achieve their intended results—“the satisfaction of public
wants and the orderly and efficient attainment of authori-
tative ends” (6). The failure, he believes, derives from our
inability to regard reform “as the intelligent management
of the contradictory motives and forces that constitute po-
litical and organizational life” (3).
The concept of responsibility is central to our ability to
deal with contradictory motives and forces, according to
Harmon. He contends that we must understand its para-
doxical character. Responsibility connotes multiple mean-
ings—both agency (that people are authors of and person-
ally responsible for their actions), as well as accountability
(that people are answerable to higher authority for their
actions) and obligation (that moral action is determined
by sources external to the agent who set standards and prin-
ciples) (6). Keeping paradoxical aspects of responsibility
in a “creative tension with one another” is the ideal. Last-
ing reform must address the problem of responsibility in
all of its varied meanings.
Harmon maintains that the rationalist discourse on gov-
ernment presents a one-sided perspective on public offi-
cials’ responsibility.2 It neglects the idea of agency and
public officials’ personal responsibility in favor of account-
ability and obligation. The neglect of agency—or the pre-
tense that it does not exist—has produced paradoxes, and
these, in turn, have created the predictable pathologies sum-
marized in table 1.
Table 1 Harmon’s Accountability Paradox:
Unresolved Paradoxes and the Pathologies
They Generate
Paradox of Obligation: If public servants are free to choose, but at the
same time are obliged to act only as authorities choose for them, then,
for all practical purposes, they are not free. Alternatively, if public
servants are free to choose, then their actions may violate obligations to
authority, making their exercise of free choice irresponsible.
Pathologies Generated:
Bureaucratic Opportunism: The sacrifice of principles to do what
is expedient and accommodating to self-interest.
Reification of Obligations and Authority: The unreflexive use of
principles to produce decisions that are compelled by principles
rather than freely made.
Paradox of Agency: If individuals acknowledge personal authorship, as
expressed through their own exercise of moral agency, then they deny
their ultimate answerability to others. On the other hand, if they assert
ultimate answerability to others, they deny their own moral agency.
Pathologies Generated:
Buck Passing: The declaration of one’s innocence by denying
personal authorship or sufficient authority and resources to
achieve an institution’s goals.
Scapegoating: Blaming an individual in order to shield an
institution’s complicity and to protect its members’ illusion of their
collective innocence.
Atrophy of Individual Moral Agency: The assertion of moral
innocence by claiming victim status and thus discouraging the
exercise of personal authorship and responsibility.
Avoidance of Individual Responsibility: The relaxation of
standards to perpetuate the illusion of victim innocence and the
lack of confrontation and candor necessary for instilling a sense of
personal answerability.
Paradox of Accountability: If public servants are solely accountable the
achievement of purposes mandated by political authority, then as
instruments of that authority they hold no personal responsibility for the
products of their actions. If, however, public servants participate in
determining public purposes, then their accountability to higher
authority is undermined.
Pathologies Generated:
Atrophy of Personal Responsibility: Denying public servants the
responsibility to establish public purposes prevents them from
accepting the consequences of their actions and acknowledging
the moral consequences of their manipulative control of others in
the interests of “effective management.”
Atrophy of Political Authority: Granting public servants the
responsibility to establish public purposes makes public servants
answerable only to themselves and enables them to covertly
manipulate political processes that determine public purposes.
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How do public servants avoid these pathologies and
maintain the “creative tension” among agency, obliga-
tion, and accountability? Although Harmon proffers no
specific advice, he does provide some broad guidance:
“[P]athologies may be managed if accountability is con-
strued chiefly as a process of dialogue” (196). Not only
is the dialogue to be conducted with fellow professionals
and elected officials, but it is to be expanded “beyond
organizational boundaries to take fuller account of po-
litical knowledge and citizen practices” (197). But what
exactly is dialogue, and how is it created? How can it be
used to deal with the contradictory forces of our political
and organizational life? Most importantly, how can it
ensure accountability?
To address these questions, I begin with a brief descrip-
tion of dialogue and its basic features, distinguishing it
from other forms of communication. An example illustrates
how dialogue occurs in actual practice. It occurs in Min-
nesota and centers on a future vision for the state’s K–12
public schools. Not only does the dialogue demonstrate
the intelligent management of contradictory motives and
forces, it also support’s Harmon’s claim that dialogue can
resolve the accountability paradox and avoid the atrophy
of personal responsibility and political authority. Yet dia-
logue comes with risks and challenges, not the least of
which are the new roles and skills required of public offi-
cials. I suggest that dialogue’s advantages outweigh its cost
as a mechanism of accountability under a particular set of
conditions: when public officials confront “wicked prob-
lems” (Roberts 2001a) that defy definition and solution,
and when traditional problem-solving methods have failed,
thus preventing any one group from imposing its defini-
tion of the problem or its solutions on others. Dialogue
can be successful in a complex, pluralistic society (Bohman
1996; Drysek 2000), but its usage depends on courageous
public officials who are willing to absorb its risks in return
for the enormous potential it holds.
Dialogue
Dialogue is a “special kind of talk” (Dixon 1996, 24).
According to one of its more renowned practitioners, physi-
cist David Bohm, the word “dialogue” comes from the
Greek dialogos: Logos means “the word” or the meaning
of the word, and dia means “through” (Bohm 1985, 1990).
This derivation suggests the image of “a stream of mean-
ing flowing among us and through us and between us—a
flow of meaning in the whole group, out of which will
emerge some new understanding, something creative”
(Bohm 1992, 16). Martin Buber (1970) captures the es-
sence of dialogue well in his classic work I and Thou. In
the I–Thou relationship, each person opens up to the con-
cerns of the other. Both parties reach beyond the limited
confines of the self to eventually say “you and me” rather
than “you or me.” In that process, neither party selectively
tunes out the other or seeks to rebut ideas with which it
disagrees. Both listen and engage each other fully, inter-
nalizing the views of the other in order to enhance their
mutual understanding. It is in this sense that dialogue is “a
process of successful relationship building” (Yankelovich
1999, 15).
Daniel Yankelovich (1999, 41–46) outlines dialogue’s
unique requirements. During a dialogue, all participants
treat one another as equals, even though there may be sta-
tus differences among them outside the dialogue. They re-
frain from exerting coercive influences over one another—
direct or indirect—in order to maintain their equality and
build some mutual respect and trust. They listen and re-
spond empathically to one another, trying to understand
what others think and feel, particularly those with whom
they disagree. They surface deep-rooted assumptions, their
own and others, without challenging or reacting to them
judgmentally and defensively. Dialogue, then, is a process
of mutual understanding that emerges when participants
treat each other with equality, not coercion, and when they
listen empathically to one another’s concerns in order to
probe their fundamental assumptions and world views.
The centrality and importance of dialogue has been ob-
scured by the many terms used to describe it. It is consid-
ered to be a fundamental aspect of “collaboration,” “stake-
holder collaboration,” and “collaborative leadership” (Gray
1989; Huxham 1996; Roberts and Bradley 1991; Chrislip
and Larson 1994). It is at the heart of what has been called
“citizen empowerment,” “civic engagement,” “citizen/com-
munity governance,” and “public deliberation” (Fishkin
1991; Mathews 1999; Box 1998; Bohman 1996; Drysek
2000). Other terms such as “participation,” “public par-
ticipation,” and “citizen participation” (McLagan and Nel
1995; King, Feltey, and Susel 1998; Thomas 1995) attempt
to capture its essence, but they should not be confused with
references to public or citizen involvement in the 1960s
and 1970s. These earlier efforts to open up access to gov-
ernment decision making through hearings, citizen advi-
sory councils, citizen panels, and public surveys did not
rely on interactive communication (Crosby, Kelly, and
Schaefer 1986; Kathlene and Martin 1991): They were
formal, one-way communications that did not rely on dia-
logue or the cocreation of meaning.
Dialogue differs from other forms of communication.
To help us understand these differences, Yankelovich
(1999) contrasts dialogue with debate and discussion (38–
41). Debate is about winning and proving the other side
wrong. Parties have a combative relationship. Each lis-
tens to the other only to find weaknesses in the other’s
argument. Each proclaims his assumptions as truth and
the assumptions of others as flawed. Each criticizes the
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other’s position and defends his own. The point is to con-
vince others there is a “right” answer and that you have it.
In contrast to debate, participants in a dialogue work to-
ward mutual understanding. They listen to find strength
and value in one another’s position. They reexamine their
own and others’ assumptions and positions. They acknowl-
edge they can learn from each other to improve thinking
on both sides. Through their co-learning, they evolve a
sense of trust and a shared identity, such that transforma-
tions in views, perspectives, and actions have been known
to occur (Roberts 2001b, 2002). Discussion, like debate
and argument, also lacks the three central elements of dia-
logue. When one or more are absent (equality without
coercion, empathic listening, and probing of assumptions),
we have discussion or some other form of talk, but we do
not have dialogue (Yankelovich 1999, 41).
Dialogue also differs from deliberation, a word that is
often used interchangeably. In deliberation, one carefully
weighs the reasons for and against a proposal or course of
action, with a view to decision (Oxford 1971, 159). Bohman
(1996) captures this distinction when he defines delibera-
tion as “dialogue with a particular goal” (57). The goal is
to use deliberation to make informed and reasoned deci-
sions about ways “to solve social problems and to over-
come political conflicts” (240). Additionally, participants
in deliberation are challenged “to justify their decisions
and opinions by appealing to common interests or by ar-
guing in terms of reasons that ‘all could accept’ in public
debate” (5). As Bohman summarizes, deliberation is “the
process of forming a public reason—one that everyone in
the deliberative process finds acceptable” (25), and it is
“public to the extent that it is a joint social activity involv-
ing all citizens” (17). Dialogue, in contrast, “opens up space
for deliberation” (61) so that public reasoning can take
place. If dialogue achieves its purpose, then a deeper con-
nection and shared identity emerges among the participants
and informs their relationship. If deliberation achieves its
purpose, then participants have been able to reason together
publicly, weighing the costs and benefits of various policy
options in order to inform their choices and decisions.
Case Study of Minnesota Dialogue on
Public Education
To explore the link between dialogue and accountabil-
ity, we turn to a case involving public education in Minne-
sota. Governor Rudy Perpich was searching for a vision-
ary proposal for K–12 education in the spring of 1985
(Roberts and King 1996).2 He was eager to “mend some
fences” after a bruising fight with educators during the 1985
legislative session. Perpich had wanted to give all students,
based on their needs and interests, the opportunity to choose
which public school they wanted to attend. He was espe-
cially concerned about options for poorer students whose
parents could not afford to move into more affluent neigh-
borhoods, where the “better” schools were located. He
believed children from lower-income families deserved the
same educational opportunities that others had. Most edu-
cators and their professional associations vigorously op-
posed his idea, warning of administrative and pedagogical
chaos if schools were open to all students beyond their
district boundaries.
Perpich’s policy initiative went down in defeat. Educa-
tors had not liked his ideas for redesigning education, which
gave students and parents public school choice. They lob-
bied hard against his proposal, taking their case to the public
and to the legislature. The divisive legislative debate that
ensued was unusual in a state known for consensual poli-
tics. Only one aspect of Perpich’s new proposal passed—a
postsecondary-enrollment option that allowed high school
juniors and seniors to attend classes in postsecondary in-
stitutions and receive both high school and college credit.
After the legislative session, Perpich wanted to move
beyond adversarial, interest group politics. He instructed
Minnesota’s commissioner of education, Ruth Randall, a
person whom he had appointed because of her innovative
ideas and well-known ability to collaborate, to convene a
dialogue on public education (Randall 1987). The specific
charge was to craft a visionary proposal for the future of
K–12 education in Minnesota.
The commissioner launched the effort by inviting groups
active in the legislative debate and “all interested parties
in the state” to join the Governor’s Discussion Group
(GDG), which eventually comprised 61 participants. De-
spite the explicit ground rule that membership was open to
all, there was initial disagreement about who had a “right”
to attend the meetings. Some participants wanted only “of-
ficial” representatives of organized groups, thereby exclud-
ing people who represented “just themselves.” After some
discussion, all interested individuals—whether they rep-
resented organized groups or not—took their place at the
table, although it was never clear whether they “were at-
tending as individuals or as organizational representatives.”
Everyone was to be on equal footing as they worked to-
gether on a vision for Minnesota education.
The GDG met regularly (at least monthly) and, by Feb-
ruary 1987, had held a total of 22 meetings. The commis-
sioner was responsible for chairing, facilitating, and staff-
ing the meetings and had two people from the Department
of Education to assist her. She also had the additional re-
sponsibility of constructing and mailing out the agenda for
each meeting, for which she actively solicited items from
the participants. At its first meeting, the GDG agreed to
divide their substantive tasks into nine major topic areas.
A planning model, which included group process proce-
dures and technical guidelines for preparing a policy docu-
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ment, was introduced later in order to facilitate a “more
structured approach” to the work.
Despite these agreements, hostility and suspicion car-
ried over from the legislative session. People were still
wary of one another, remembering the angry outbursts and
personal attacks that had characterized their recent inter-
actions. But rather than return to the divisive politics of
the past, the GDG agreed to move on an alternative path.
At the commissioner’s urging, members decided to avoid
debate and instead search for a consensus on problem defi-
nitions. Solutions, they acknowledged, could be debated
later. Central to consensus building would be the explora-
tion of what participants referred to as the “givens” of
Minnesota education—tacit assumptions that people car-
ried with them when they used words such as “school,”
“teacher,” and “student.” Members also agreed that, in
order to get to the fundamental problems of education,
they had to put “everything on the table” for reexamina-
tion, even their most cherished ideas and views. Explor-
ing different interpretations of the term visionary was just
one aspect of this effort.
By questioning assumptions and sharing information
about the existing condition of education from each of their
perspectives, they started to build a more complete under-
standing of the challenges facing education in the twenty-
first century. Instead of blaming one another for the ills of
education, they began to explore the societal dynamics that
had contributed to its current state. Different voices, espe-
cially those who had been less vocal during the legislative
debates, helped in this regard. They expressed doubts that
the previous positions, staked out by the adversaries, rep-
resented the complete picture of the problems or what
needed to be done to correct them. Their openness enabled
others to reconsider their entrenched positions and to see
some value in what others had to say. Eventually, mem-
bers came to understand that addressing the problems of
education would require their combined efforts, not just
their individual solutions.
As members focused on the problems of education, they
also began to open up to one another as individuals and to
inquire about one another’s motivations for attending the
GDG. Explanations were very personal and revealing, add-
ing another dimension to the interactions. Participants be-
came human to one another—more than just a position or
a point of view—and they started to know and accept one
another as individuals. Their language reflected this tran-
sition: Midway through the GDG process, former adver-
saries began to speak of the group in terms of “we” rather
than “us” and “them.” They described their efforts in terms
of “building relationships” and “building trust.” Previous
opponents started to agree with speakers from the “oppo-
sition” and validated their points. Laughter and supportive
statements replaced negative and hostile comments. People
acknowledged everyone’s right to be at the table because
all shared a common concern for education. Thinking about
these changes, one member characterized his participation
in the GDG as a “growth experience.” There was learning
on all sides: School people became more “flexible,” and
business people became “better informed of the magni-
tude and complexity of managing public education.”
Participants also evolved some mutually accepted norms
to govern their interactions. They preferred to work together
collectively and resisted suggestions to split into subgroups.
Whenever temporary subgroups were necessary to gather
data or to prepare position papers, members from different
perspectives volunteered to work together and report back
to the larger group at the next meeting. These norms were
occasionally violated, however, more from confusion over
group process than any subgroup’s attempt to control or
manipulate the agenda. At the final meeting, for example,
items were added to the proposal to accommodate one
member, even though the group had closed the agenda item.
This action took place during a particularly confusing time,
when members were unclear which items had been ac-
cepted or deleted from the proposal to the governor. An-
other member was so angry about these last-minute changes
that he threatened to withhold his signature from the docu-
ment, but after some discussion, he agreed to sign it.
By December 1986, the GDG had completed its vision-
ary proposal for state education, signed by all members of
the group. With some modifications in February, it included
a voluntary K–12 open-enrollment options program, the
expansion of school choice to at-risk students, school-site
management, and testing for student performance. Partici-
pants had mixed opinions as to whether the visionary pro-
posal was really innovative and visionary. One respondent
wrote, “To the extent that much of the material had been
discussed in the ‘idea stage’ before, it was not particularly
innovative. To the extent that much of it had not actually
been tried in the state, it was innovative.” Follow-up dis-
cussions clarified what many participants had seen as the
real innovation—the dialogical process itself.
The commissioner noted that “this is the first time that
the major education organizations, businesses, higher edu-
cation and broad-based citizen organizations have agreed
to a common agenda prior to any major legislative ses-
sion. While at times frustrating, it was also satisfying to
see that experts in the field of education could come from
so many different polarized positions and reach a consen-
sus on (a) visionary plan for education.” Another partici-
pant described the GDG as “the only experience where
small groups and large [have had] the opportunity to be
heard and have their issues discussed openly. Otherwise,
policies [are] determined solely by the groups that have
the most political clout—and PAC money—in the legisla-
tive setting.” Removed from the normally divisive and com-
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bative politics of the legislative process, participants ac-
knowledged the additional benefits of dialogue. They had
the time to assess the merits of new ideas, determine who
was interested in them, and ascertain whether agreements
were possible. As one participant summarized, the dialogue
“allowed people to get to know one another personally and
learn about one another’s positions in a non-threatening
environment. It showed how people of good will can change
attitudes and behaviors.” Outsiders, apparently, agreed: One
observer called the dialogue “the most important interven-
tion into educational policy making in Minnesota.”
The outcomes of the GDG were particularly notewor-
thy. The governor responded to the proposal by incorpo-
rating its basic features into his legislative package. Al-
though one staff member reported on the governor’s initial
surprise that the proposal was not more visionary, Perpich
nonetheless publicly commended the commissioner and
the GDG participants for their hard work and hailed their
efforts as an important contribution to Minnesota public
education. The legislative session that followed was very
different in tone and substance from the 1985 session. The
very act of signing the visionary proposal had a dampen-
ing effect on interest group politics. No acrimonious de-
bate among the educational interest groups occurred. No
one from the GDG “broke ranks” and returned to “politics
as usual.” All participants remained committed to their vi-
sion for state education—so much so that legislators had
difficulty finding anyone to testify against the governor’s
proposal during the hearings. Having worked out their dif-
ferences and built a consensus on the proposal to the gov-
ernor, members of the GDG saw no reason to criticize what
they had had a hand in creating. Signing the document had
created a new social contract that members considered
themselves bound to support. By the end of the 1987 leg-
islative session, the GDG’s basic recommendations, cham-
pioned by the governor, were enacted into law. By the end
of the 1988 legislative session, Minnesota had passed the
first public school choice program in the country, enabling
all K–12 students to attend their public school of choice
by 1990–91. A majority of the participants considered their
initial proposal to be a direct link to the 1988 legislation.
Said one participant, “the agreed-upon planks were very
instrumental in greasing the skids for passage.”
Dialogue and Accountability
The Minnesota dialogue on public education succeeded
in achieving mutual understanding among the participants.4
Although the GDG continued to disagree on particular edu-
cational issues, even up to its last meeting, it moved be-
yond members’ differences to establish relationships based
on mutuality and respect. Not everyone agreed on all sub-
stantive points—but for dialogue to occur, not everyone had
to. Having established the existence of dialogue, we are
now ready to examine Harmon’s claim. To what extent did
dialogue ensure accountability? Analysis begins with an ex-
amination of the traditional mechanisms of accountability
that were reinforced during the dialogue.
Traditional Mechanisms of Accountability
There is clear evidence of bureaucratic or hierarchical
accountability. As a political appointee, the commissioner
of education was answerable to her supervisor, the gover-
nor. She constantly updated him on the GDG’s progress
and ultimately fulfilled his directive to craft a visionary
proposal for K–12 public education, even though there was
some difference of opinion as to how visionary the pro-
posal was. She also was politically accountable to legisla-
tors, educational interest groups, and constituents. She and
members of her department briefed legislators on the
GDG’s progress and kept them abreast of its ongoing de-
velopments. The “stakeholder audit” (Roberts and King
1989) that she conducted early in her administration en-
abled her to identify stakeholders on the issue of public
school choice and educational reform. Not only were they
invited to attend the GDG, but, using extensive media chan-
nels, she asked “all interested parties” in the state to join
them at the table.
There is also evidence of professional accountability in
the way the GDG was structured and run and the way par-
ticipants conducted themselves through the process. GDG
members developed their agenda collaboratively and modi-
fied it as interests and issues evolved. The staff set up meet-
ings, prepared background materials, and recorded the
minutes for each session. The commissioner served as the
GDG’s facilitator—a neutral servant of the group, not a
champion of any particular solution or point of view. Her
role was to ensure that all voices had a fair hearing, so that
people could listen and learn from one another. In this ca-
pacity, she espoused values of inclusion, trust, collabora-
tion, and participation, norms that were characteristic of
her department’s and the general Minnesota culture.
Her neutrality was tested on many occasions. Some
participants, especially early on in the process, wanted
her to take sides. They criticized her for not being proac-
tive and helping them with their particular “cause.” It was
a tribute to her even-handedness that advocates of public
school choice said she moved too slowly and sided too
often with traditional educational groups, and the oppo-
nents of public school choice said she moved too quickly
and was too closely aligned with the “change agents.”
Paradoxically, the fact that each group accused the com-
missioner of siding with the other is perhaps the best evi-
dence of her fairness. Attempts to politicize the GDG’s
deliberations also challenged her skills. Various stake-
holder groups initially attempted to work behind the
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scenes to control the agenda and end-run the process.
Some threatened to bolt the dialogical process and take
the competing views into the legislative arena. With the
governor’s backing, the commissioner countered these
efforts and convinced everyone to stay at the table and
work together, not separately, for what they wanted.
Thus, both informal and formal mechanisms of account-
ability existed. The GDG maintained the norms, ethics,
and mores of professional conduct, even during the most
contentious moments. Formal accountability existed
through executive and legislative oversight and interest
group and citizen involvement. Only judicial accountabil-
ity was not exercised. Satisfied with the process and its
outcome, neither the participants nor the general public
found it necessary to file lawsuits to protect their interests.
Dialogue’s Added Value
The Minnesota dialogue on education was a public pro-
cess, widely covered by the press at the local, state, and
national levels (Roberts and King 1996). Representatives
from the media attended meetings on a regular basis and,
through their widespread coverage, kept public attention
focused on the GDG’s agenda and activities. With this ex-
posure, the dialogue did not violate nor replace traditional
mechanisms, but reinforced them by making traditional
accountability mechanisms more transparent and visible.
Most importantly, the publicness of the dialogue made
participants accountable to one another (Drysek 2000;
Bohman 1996). They built relationships on mutual listen-
ing and learning. Once established, a return to adversarial
politics was less attractive, as the two subsequent legisla-
tive sessions demonstrated. Members were reluctant to tes-
tify against the governor’s legislative initiative, not only
because of their unanimous support for the proposal to the
governor, but because they did not want to reactivate com-
petitive, interest group politics. They had come to under-
stand the limitations of pursuing self-interests in dealing
with complex questions such as the future of Minnesota
public education. Their commitment to cocreate a future
signaled there was merit in working together rather than
operating independently and competitively. Thus, the so-
cial network they created, based on the norms of reciproc-
ity and trustworthiness, generated social capital for their
future work together (Putnam 2000).
Dialogue also established a space for deliberation to
occur (Bohman 1996). Toning down the rhetoric enabled
participants to hear one another and refocused attention
on educational issues, not just on personalities. Alterna-
tive solutions to educational problems were addressed with-
out demonizing the opposition. Participants were able to
get a fair hearing for their ideas and opinions before the
group ultimately made its decisions about what to endorse
for state education. Most importantly, through the press
coverage, the GDG became a vehicle for public learning
about education. Group members not only broadened their
own understanding, they also helped the larger public to
clarify its views and to come to terms with some highly
charged and contentious issues. What began as poorly
formed public opinion on public school choice eventually
became public judgment (Yankelovich 1991) that strongly
endorsed public school choice for Minnesota schools. The
polls reflected this transition: When first queried in 1985,
only 18 percent of Minnesotans knew what school choice
was and endorsed it for all grade levels. By 1992, 76 per-
cent of those surveyed favored public school choice (Rob-
erts and King 1996, 189). As the GDG publicly reasoned
and learned, so did the larger public.5
These examples illustrate, at least in the Minnesota case,
how the accountability paradox was resolved. The gover-
nor opened up a public space for dialogue and delibera-
tion. His decision to create the GDG, although risky con-
sidering his antagonistic relations with some educational
groups, signaled a willingness to try an alternative to
adversarial politics. The new forum he created invited par-
ticipants to reason together publicly about educational is-
sues and gave voice to those who had had trouble being
heard above the din of legislative debates. Members un-
derstood they would not be the ultimate decision makers
on educational policy, but they were fully aware of the
important role they were asked to play. They rose to the
occasion and assumed personal responsibility for helping
to create a future vision for public education. They lis-
tened to one another’s views, achieved mutual understand-
ing, and collectively came to a decision that all could live
with, even though some participants were not enthusiastic
about some of its features. Moreover, they accepted the
consequences of their decision and refused to undermine
their unanimous agreement. Their public commitment to
one another illustrates the benefits of an accountability
system that joins personal agency and answerability to
higher authority. Yet, the GDG offered even more.
The commissioner and the Department of Education
members who staffed the GDG served as neutral servants
to the group. They facilitated meetings and provided in-
formation, even expert opinion, when requested. In shar-
ing responsibility for agenda creation and decision mak-
ing, they relinquished what formally had been theirs to
control. The principles for meeting management that they
followed (Bentley 1994; Swartz 1994), although at times
challenged, created a level playing field where all voices
could be heard on an equal footing. Their obligation was
not to control the group’s outcomes; it was to be the pro-
tector of the group’s process. They understood the GDG’s
proposal would be a product of dialogue and deliberation,
not just a reflection of what they, as experts in the Depart-
ment of Education, wanted. Obligation, combined with
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accountability and personal agency, complete Harmon’s
triumvirate of responsibility. Taken together, they formed
a system of responsibility that was stronger than the sum
of its parts.
The Costs of Dialogue as a Mechanism of
Accountability
Despite the apparent advantages of dialogue in the Min-
nesota case, it is important to acknowledge that dialogue
comes with significant risks and challenges as a mecha-
nism of accountability. Risk stems from several factors.
Dialogue is transparent, calling everyone into account for
their values, views, and behavior, especially when the press
is reporting on participants’ every move. There is nowhere
to hide if things go wrong. Dialogue also can fail just as
well as it can succeed, and there have been failures
(Kaboolian 1999; Isaacs 1999). Public embarrassment can
be career ending for public officials. Traditional expecta-
tions for leadership behavior also are violated. Leaders of
a dialogue convene and facilitate a process, they do not
take control and direct the outcomes. They become stew-
ards of a democratic process rather than advocates of a
particular point of view. Stewardship is not well under-
stood or appreciated (Block 1993; Reich 1990), and it can
prompt criticism from a number of quarters.
The commissioner, for example, was criticized for “not
being decisive” and not knowing how to run “proper meet-
ings.” According to some, she did not exercise “control”
over the meetings and appropriately use Robert’s Rules of
Order. Her insistence on consensus alienated those who
were steeped in interest group politics and who expected
to “win” over others rather than learn from them. Other
public officials have had similar experiences. William
Ruckelshaus, former head of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, was chided by the press and by the public for
the agency-sponsored deliberations in Tacoma, Washing-
ton. One area resident accused him of copping out of his
responsibilities (Scott 1990, 165), and another complained,
“we elected people to run our government, we don’t ex-
pect them to turn around and ask us to run it for them”
(167). Said another, “these issues are very complex and
the public is not sophisticated enough to make these deci-
sions. This is not to say that the EPA doesn’t have an obli-
gation to inform the public, but information is one thing—
defaulting on its legal mandate is another” (167).
Dialogue also can be time consuming and resource de-
manding. The GDG met monthly over an 18-month pe-
riod for at least two hours per meeting, and it also held
retreats and special sessions when the need arose. Besides
the governor’s, the commissioner’s, and the participants’
time, two departmental members staffed the sessions and
other departmental personnel gathered documentation and
provided expert opinion when the GDG called for it. These
costs were similar to the requirements for other events.
The commissioner, when serving as a local school district
superintendent, had 101 staff members trained to conduct
public meetings so that they could serve as conveners, pre-
senters, and observers of the public (Roberts 1985).
Roughly 30 people from a regional EPA office are reported
to have worked full time for four months on the EPA case
in Tacoma, Washington (Scott 1990, 169).6
Dialogue also can be challenging to employ. There are
new leadership roles and new skills to learn (Chrislip and
Larson 1994; Senge 1990). Care must be taken during the
initial meetings to set expectations for a new way of being
together and to reinforce the idea that everyone has a re-
sponsibility to make it work. Taking time to explain what
dialogue is, how it is different from other means of com-
munication, and why it is being used as an alternative mode
of operating is important. People do not necessarily know
how to listen, be self-reflective, or reason together. Their
history of relating to one another as advocates in a win–
lose political contest makes the transition to co-learner in
dialogue frustratingly slow. People need to be realistic about
the time commitments and the learning required. Public
officials also should be ready to deal with those who con-
tinue to operate out of a political framework—and they
will. Everyone needs to be reminded of their commitment
to one another so that the entire group can monitor its own
development. Changes in behavior do not come easily or
quickly, and there are setbacks—they are to be expected
(Isaacs 1999). Larger numbers of people involved in the
dialogic process also test the management skills of even
the most accomplished facilitator. Getting so many people
involved is not a trivial undertaking. Fortunately, practi-
tioners have been inventing new techniques for large
groups, and the results have been very promising both na-
tionally and internationally (Emery and Purser 1996;
Weisbord 1992; Weisbord and Janoff 1995; Thomas 1995).7
When to Use Dialogue as a Mechanism of
Accountability
The Minnesota dialogue on public education has en-
abled us to explore the finer points of dialogue and the
extent to which it avoids the paradoxes and pathologies of
traditional mechanisms of accountability. But, consider-
ing its risks and challenges, public officials would do well
to ask whether it should be universally applied to all situa-
tions, or whether special circumstances warrant its usage.
Although current research is far from definitive, dialogue
appears to be a particularly useful mechanism of account-
ability when problems and solutions are contested and when
traditional problem-solving methods have failed because
no one group can impose its definition of the problem or
its solutions on others. All of these conditions applied in
the Minnesota case.
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Finding a vision for Minnesota public education was a
“wicked problem” (Churchman 1967; Roberts 2001a). As
the initial GDG meetings revealed, neither the problems
nor their solutions were clearly definable. Some partici-
pants described the problem as the schools’ monopoly con-
trol over students and the schools’ resistance to innovation
and change. For them, school choice became the preferred
solution. Others defined the problem as a lack of funding
that prevented schools from delivering on their educational
mission. They viewed increased school funding as the only
option. The problem statement was dynamic and evolved
as new aspects and constraints surfaced and as participants
listened to and learned from one another. None of the par-
ticipants had a complete picture of public education. Edu-
cators needed to hear from businesses, which were con-
cerned about the quality of students’ learning and how much
money business was investing in remedial education.
Change agents needed to appreciate the challenges of class-
room teaching without the requisite materials and re-
sources. And teachers needed to hear there were viable
venues for learning besides traditional classroom instruc-
tion. Dialogue helped them to cross the jurisdictions that
divided them—separate organizations, sectors, and disci-
plines—and allowed them to evolve a more complete pic-
ture of education as a whole. Only through their collective
learning process were they eventually able to agree on a
vision of education that all could support.
People also had to “fail into” dialogue (Roberts 2001a).
In 1985, the governor failed to get his ambitious policy
agenda through the legislature. Educational groups got a
black eye for being resistant to change and innovation. The
business community did not get the attention focused on
their education proposals. And the legislature, unable to
sort out competing interest group claims, deferred judg-
ment on what to do, annoying a public that was expecting
reform in education. Groups pressing for narrow, special-
ized interests had to learn that, in acting alone, they would
not be able to get everything they wanted—and more im-
portantly, that scarce resources would have to be devoted
to blocking others from taking action rather than getting
something done. Only when they recognized the futility of
what John Gardner (1981) calls the “war of the parts against
the whole” (19) were they able to break the impasse. De-
spite its risks and challenges, dialogue came to be viewed
as preferable to adversarial politics, especially when there
were few alternatives to deal with a wicked problem that
required comprehensive and integrated treatment across
both public and private sectors.
Conclusion
According to John Dryzek (2000), democratic theory
has taken a decidedly “deliberative turn,” and so, might
we add, has democratic practice. The numbers of national
and international dialogues (mutual understanding among
participants) and deliberations (public reasoning and prob-
lem solving on policy issues in order to make choices
and decisions) grow daily. Topics cover a range of issues
from the environment, housing, and community devel-
opment, to education, health care, and international rela-
tions (Saunders 1999; Susskind, McKearnan, and Tho-
mas-Larmer 1999). The Minnesota dialogue on public
education, as one example, has been the focal point of
this analysis. It has served as a vehicle for exploring
Harmon’s (1995) claim that dialogue can resolve the ac-
countability paradox and avoid the pathologies inherent
in traditional mechanisms. Participants did build a sys-
tem of responsibility based on personal agency, account-
ability to authority, and obligation to external principles
and standards. Not only did their dialogue reinforce tra-
ditional accountability mechanisms by making them more
transparent and visible, it created a space for participant
learning and deliberation to occur. Thus, the social net-
work they created, based on the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness, generated social capital for their future
work together (Putnam 2000).
The GDG also became a vehicle for public learning
about education. Thanks to the press coverage, the GDG
dialogue not only broadened participants’ understanding,
but it also helped the larger public clarify its views. Public
opinion gradually moved from poorly formed ideas about
choice to strong endorsements of public school choice for
Minnesota schools. Thus, the GDG became a vehicle to
guide public reasoning and learning on a highly complex
and contentious issue.
Yet, for all the questions the case answered, a host of
others remain: Is dialogue always successful as a mecha-
nism of accountability? Does it always lead to positive
outcomes? If not, what are the conditions for its success or
failure? Should it be used in all circumstances, or is it ad-
visable to be selective in its application, given the com-
plexities and costs involved? If dialogue is used selectively,
who determines when and how it will be used? If it is to
have widespread usage, what are the implications for other
mechanisms of accountability and for the governance struc-
ture in which it is embedded? Judging by the growing in-
terest and practice of dialogue, there will be ample oppor-
tunities to address these questions in the future. This is
only the beginning of what promises to be an exciting av-
enue for public administration research and practice.
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Notes
1. The term “procedure-based accountability” reflects an em-
phasis on controlling work processes rather than focusing on
outputs and outcomes. Examples include laws and regula-
tions on personnel hiring and firing, budgeting, and acquisi-
tion. See Gore (1993) for a critique of process controls as
opposed to result-oriented controls.
2. See Harmon (1995), chapters 3 and 7, for a review.
3. The field study on the GDG was embedded within a larger
five-year longitudinal study of policy entrepreneurship that
was conducted 1983–88 (Roberts and King 1996). Data were
collected from multiple sources, using various research meth-
ods: interviews, archival records, newspaper reports, field
notes based on observations of the GDG, and written com-
ments from a survey of the 61 GDG participants. The two
field workers conducting this research were granted free ac-
cess to all formal meetings and activities of the GDG (in-
cluding one day-long retreat and three day-long meetings).
They gathered additional information from GDG members
through informal conversations, telephone calls, and follow-
up interviews. Other scholars’ research papers on the GDG
and field notes from 19 interviews with GDG participants
also were available.
4. I used Yankelovich’s (1999) three indicators (equal partici-
pation, empathic listening, and questioning of assumptions)
to establish the presence of dialogue. As an additional check,
I used indicators recommended by other scholars: disciplined,
collective thought processes (Isaacs 2001); arousal and regu-
lation of positive affective states (Bradley 2001); and “con-
versational moves”—how participants changed their language
and patterns of speech over time (Gergin, McNamee, and
Barrett 2001). All indicators supported the presence of dia-
logue.
5. The presence of both dialogue and deliberation in this case
should not be construed as a linear process—that is, first one
occurs, and then the other. The two processes were interre-
lated and mutually reinforcing. Relationships based on mu-
tual understanding developed as deliberations over substan-
tive issues occurred, and reasoning over educational problems
helped to create mutual relationships built on respect and trust.
We can speculate that, in all likelihood, the coexistence of
dialogue and deliberation was a factor in the success of both
processes. At the same time, we know there are other occa-
sions when there is dialogue without deliberation and delib-
eration without dialogue (Mathews 1999). Future research
will have to unravel the subtle interplay between the two and
the extent to which their presence or absence is a factor in the
outcomes.
6. The costs of dialogue need to be put in perspective. Interest
group politics and “adversarial legalism” (Kagan 1991;
Kelman 1992) ) also have their costs. The hidden costs of
court battles in defense of stakeholder interests and the op-
portunity costs for not getting things done should be factored
in as well.
7. Use of Internet technology to supplement face-to-face meet-
ings also might be feasible, but experts are not sanguine about
its potential for dialogue and do not recommend it as a sub-
stitute for face-to-face communications (Evans 2001).
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